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Abstract:  The state of Indiana has had a major foreclosure problem, especially since 
the 2001 recession. As the nation confronts an emerging surge in foreclosures associated 
with an explosion of subprime loans in 2004-06, the Indiana foreclosure rate is likely to 
surge to record territory. Two neighboring states, Michigan and Ohio, join Indiana in 
having the nation’s highest foreclosure rates. In fact, Ohio has led the nation since 2003, 
knocking Indiana into second place since then.  Meanwhile, Michigan climbed to third 
place since mid-2006. This report provides a perspective on the crisis in Indiana and its 
sources. The principal source of the high foreclosure rate in Indiana is the predominance 
of high risk loans, originally from FHA and later from subprime lenders. Slow house 
price appreciation and slow employment growth are statistically significant factors 
accounting for state foreclosure rates, but these factors have not been especially weak 
since 2001 and they are highly correlated with the share of risky loans.  Other factors that 
are frequently mentioned do not fit the pattern of emerging foreclosure from 1995-2006, 
or they are not large enough to have had much substantive effect on the overall 
foreclosure picture.  These include auto sector and manufacturing production and 
employment or predatory lending and mortgage fraud. Education of borrowers, especially 
first-time buyers, and the education of lenders in traditional prudent lending practices are 
more likely to foster lower foreclosure rates than other remedies and to do so without 
reducing homeownership rates. 
 
Keywords:  Foreclosure rate, mortgage f inance, mortgage risk. 
 
The views expressed are those of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
Networks Financial Institute. Please address questions regarding content to John Tatom at 
john.tatom@isunetworks.org. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author. 
 
NFI working papers and other publications are available on NFI’s website 
(www.networksfinancialinstitute.org).  Click “Research” and then “Publications/Papers.” 
 1
Why Is the Foreclosure Rate So High in Indiana?  
 
The state of Indiana has had a major foreclosure problem since the recession in 2001 and, 
as the nation confronts an emerging surge in foreclosures associated with an explosion of 
subprime loans in 2004-06, the Indiana foreclosure rate is likely to surge to extremely 
high, record territory. This would have serious consequences for Indiana homeowners, 
lenders, their stockholders, the housing industry and neighborhood home prices, 
abandoned homes and the overall economy.  Indiana is not alone. Two neighboring 
states, Michigan and Ohio, join Indiana in having the nation’s highest foreclosure rates. 
In fact, Ohio has had the nation’s highest foreclosure rate since 2003, knocking Indiana 
into second place since then.  Meanwhile, Michigan climbed to third place since mid-
2006 and Kentucky has been in fourth or fifth place since mid-2003.1   
 
There is already widespread concern among policy makers and economic analysts for the 
emerging national spike in foreclosures. Since the beginning of 2007, a large number of 
mortgage lenders have gone out of business, sought bankruptcy protection or ceased risky 
lending activities. In July and August repricing of risky mortgage products and related 
derivatives led to a credit crunch and liquidity problem in global financial markets as 
hedge funds, large financial institutions and other investment funds revealed large losses 
and in some cases closures of funds.  Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2007) 
has pointed out that about 24 percent of all first lien mortgages are subprime (14%) or alt-
A (about 9%) The latter is a risk class above subprime loans in credit score, but that 
includes loans that have other higher risk characteristics, especially so-called “no-doc” 
loans which do not require documentation of income.  Most of the large share of risky 
mortgages has emerged since 2004.2
 
Subprime loans are loans to individuals with low credit scores and relatively high 
expected default and foreclosure rates and higher mortgage interest rates.  Many of these 
loans have other risky features, such as allowing interest only or other payment choices 
by borrowers in the early years of a mortgage. Some of these nontraditional loans were 
only available to high income/high net worth individuals until recent years when new 
technologies made it possible to price and offer such high risk loans. For a variety of 
reasons, but especially because so many of them have adjustable interest rates that will 
adjust upward in the near future, an already high national foreclosure rate among 
subprime loans is expected to lead to a spike in foreclosures over the next year or so.  If 
the impact of this spike falls proportionately on Indiana, Ohio and Michigan, the region 
could see a depression in housing, with consequent adverse effects on housing, lenders 
and the overall economy.   
 
This report provides a perspective on the crisis in Indiana and its sources up to 2007.  The 
report also discusses the situations in Ohio and Michigan because they join Indiana in 
having the three highest state foreclosure rates in the country. The report draws heavily 
                                                 
1 These states have not always led the nation.  In 1995, regional foreclosure rates reached their last lows 
and were below the national rate.  The national foreclosure rate was 0.88 percent, while Indiana registered 
0.48%, Ohio 0.68%, Michigan 0.40%, Kentucky 0.38% and Illinois 0.72.    
2 Chiu (2006) provides an introduction to the development of nontraditional and alt-A mortgages.  
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on earlier statistical analyses conducted by the National Association of REALTORS 
(NAR), but it must be emphasized that they are in no way responsible for the results here. 
In 2003, the Metropolitan Indianapolis Board of REALTORS (MIBOR), the Builders 
Association of Greater Indianapolis, the Indiana Builders Association, the Indiana 
Association of REALTORS and the Indianapolis Neighborhood Partnership sponsored 
research by the NAR on Indiana’s high foreclosure problem. The NAR study (2003) 
attempted to explain the factors influencing foreclosures and why Indiana already led the 
nation. NAR (2004) is a revised and final version. 
 
NAR (2003, 2004) conclude that the 2001 recession and its aftermath led to unusually 
high foreclosures in Indiana. Specifically, foreclosures “rose dramatically and nearly 
contemporaneously with the demise in the state’s job market situation.” [NAR (2004, 
p.13)]. The deterioration was worse in Indiana, in their view, because of the greater 
reliance on manufacturing.  The reports conclude that the weak job market may have 
driven buyers to riskier loans with higher Loan-To-Value ratios (LTVs). In their view, 
rapid homebuilding continued despite the rising foreclosure rate, slowing home price 
appreciation and reducing the incentive to stay in homes/loans in times of financial 
distress. All of these factors then are in some way related to the job market deterioration.  
Given an expected improvement in the job market, the NAR expected a normal cyclical 
recovery in the foreclosure rate moving in tandem with a cyclical recovery in the job 
market.  Obviously something went wrong.  Foreclosures remained high in Indiana, Ohio 
and Michigan despite the cyclical improvement in the national economy, and, at least in 
Indiana, in the state economy. This report provides an update and suggests some of the 
problems that will face these states in the coming years.   
 
I. The foreclosure rate in Indiana has been a serious problem since 2002 
The foreclosure rate in Indiana has been a serious problem for several years.  Indeed, the 
unusually high level in 2002 led to the reports noted above.  The foreclosure rate has 
remained very high in Indiana since then.  Chart 1 shows the foreclosure rate in the 
United States, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio.  Ohio has led the nation since 2003, with 
Indiana a close second. Meanwhile the rate in Michigan moved into the top 10 in the 
country in 2004 and reached third place in 2006. Kentucky (not shown) has ranked in the 
top 5 states since 2003. Illinois has escaped the top 10 list for most of the period since the 
2001 recession.  Note that in Indiana and Ohio, the foreclosure rate began to rise in 1995, 
when it was well below the national level, and it climbed more before the 2001 recession 
than it has since.  Michigan also recorded its previous low in 1995 and rose slightly more 
before the recession than it has since, but its sharp rise begins a little latter in 1998. 
 
The worst aspect of Chart 1 is what is not shown.  What is not shown is the explosion in 
subprime foreclosures that is about to send the national statistics, and perhaps those of the 
three states shown, into record territory.   
 
 
Chart 1 
Indiana and its neighbors have the highest foreclosure rates in the nation 
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Ohio and Indiana foreclosure rates lead the nation
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Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
Table 1 shows the most recent foreclosure information for Indiana and the nation.  Note 
that FHA and subprime loans in Indiana make up a higher percentage of all loans than for 
the nation (27.8% versus 21.2%).  In Indiana, subprime loans are a little smaller share, 
but FHA loans are a much larger share.   
 
Table 1 
Indiana and U.S. foreclosures in the first quarter of 2006    
 Foreclosure 
rate 
Loans 
serviced 
Loans in 
Foreclosure  
Percent of 
loans 
serviced 
Percent of 
foreclosed 
loans 
Indiana 
Prime      1.40% 573,745   8,032     69.5%    32.7% 
Subprime 9.57 122,033 11,679 14.8 47.5 
FHA 3.95 107,198   4,234 13.0 17.2 
All loans 2.98 825,008 24,585     100.0      100.0 
United States 
Prime 0.54 33.924,965  183,195 78.6  32.6 
Subprime 5.10   5,878,011 299,779 13.4  53.4 
FHA 2.19   2,981,809   65,302   6.8  11.6 
All loans 1.28 43,895,066 561,857    100.0 100.0 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
The share of subprime and FHA loans in foreclosure in Indiana, 64.7%, is essentially the 
same as the 65% share for the United States as a whole, although the share of FHA loans 
(13.0%) in Indiana is almost double the U.S. share (6.8%) and this, unlike the recent 
national spike in the volume of subprime loans, has been a feature of Indiana mortgage 
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finance for several years.  Nevertheless, the foreclosure rate in Indiana is not higher 
simply because of a greater share of riskier loans; all categories of risk in Indiana have 
higher foreclosure rates than for the United States.  In particular, even prime loans have a 
foreclosure rate that is 2.6 times the national rate for prime loans and this plays a major 
role in Indiana’s foreclosure rate being about 2.3 times the national average rate.   
 
Table 2 shows that subprime loans have much higher foreclosure rates in both the United 
States and in Indiana.  Adjustable rate loans have much higher foreclosure rates than 
fixed rate mortgages.  So the highest foreclosure rates are adjustable rate subprime loans.  
Note that for prime loans, there are more than four times as many loans with fixed rates 
(FRM) as adjustable rates (ARM) in Indiana and almost as large a multiple for the United 
States as a whole.  For subprime loans, the relative magnitudes are quite different. 
 
Table 2 
Subprime loans are more likely to be adjustable (ARM) than to have a fixed rate 
(FRM) 
 Indiana United States 
 Foreclosure rate Loans 
serviced 
Foreclosure 
rate 
Loans serviced 
Prime     
-FRM    1.15%      458,404    0.38% 23,694,889 
-ARM 3.19 56,058 1.09   6,079,823 
Subprime     
-FRM 6.37 53,793 3.29   2,130,443 
-ARM            12.93 58,572 6.46   2,901,511 
FHA     
-FRM 3.63 90,828 1.85 2,371,167 
-ARM 5.23  8,111 2.73    192,924 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
For the United States, there are over 36 percent more ARMs than FRMs among subprime 
borrowers; in Indiana, there are almost 9 percent more ARMs than FRMs among 
subprime borrowers.  Even among FHA loans, which used to be the primary source of 
funds for subprime borrowers, better counseled, more informed, or simply more cautious 
borrowers (or lenders) have resulted in relatively fewer borrowers with adjustable rate 
loans than even among prime borrowers.   The much higher foreclosure rates among 
subprime borrowers and relatively larger proportions of adjustable rate loans, which have 
disproportionately higher foreclosure rates, combine to make the subprime category the 
focal point for the emerging national foreclosure crisis.  As the foreclosure rate on these 
loans continues to rise for loans that originated largely in 2004-06, the regional states’ 
and the national foreclosure rate will rise sharply.  This is especially the case because so 
many of the subprime loans are adjustable and will adjust upward in the near future, even 
if long-term mortgage rates do not.   
 
II. Factors that Affect the Foreclosure Rate 
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In NAR (2003 and 2004), several factors are set out that influence foreclosure. They 
include relatively high homeownership rates, the share of Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) loans, the proportion of loans that have a high loan-to-value ratio, 
job growth in the state, the rate of home price appreciation, or the state unemployment 
rate.     
 
A higher home ownership rate might suggest more marginal and riskier buyers and 
borrowers and therefore be associated with a higher foreclosure rate. FHA loans are 
riskier loans intended for first-time and generally lower-income/less-wealthy 
homebuyers, so a higher share is expected to be associated with a higher foreclosure rate. 
FHA loans are also riskier because they generally have lower down payments than others, 
so that borrowers are more likely to default or walk away from their loans in times of 
financial stress, such as unemployment spells, or when the return for remaining in a loan 
and house are expected to have lower economic returns or benefits. But other borrowers 
also have the same characteristics and end up in foreclosure.  Thus, a high-loan-to-value 
(price) ratio (LTV), in this case an LTV greater than 90 percent (LTV90), could be a 
separate factor leading to higher foreclosures. Such a loan means that the owner has made 
a down payment of less than 10 percent of the purchase price, or value, of the home and 
therefore has less to lose if they lose the house through foreclosure.  In addition, a slower 
pace of house appreciation means that equity in the home is rising more slowly, again 
implying that there is a relatively smaller gain in homeowner equity in homes and 
perhaps less expected gain from remaining in a house and its associated mortgage loan. 
Finally a higher unemployment rate means typically means more economic distress due 
to lost income so that one might expect to observe more foreclosures.    
 
The inclusion of foreclosures and the growth rate of payroll employment might seem 
redundant since both are highly correlated with each other.  While both measure the same 
job market conditions to a degree, they are slightly different.  The unemployment rate 
may be a closer indicator of distress and actual job and income losses, but slower growth 
in payroll employment might signal more difficulty in finding work. Normally the two 
measures move closely in an inverse relationship, but this does not have to be the case.  
In a state with little population growth like Indiana, slow job growth is likely even under 
the best of economic conditions because of relatively slow population and labor force 
growth.  Business could be booming and the unemployment rate could be relatively low, 
but job growth would still be slow.  In this case, income growth will be nearly as great as 
possible and the prospects for foreclosures should be relatively low, unless there are other 
factors, such as low productivity growth or poor housing or housing finance market 
performance.  
 
There are other factors that affect foreclosure. One of the most important today is that 
innovations on housing markets have made loans to subprime borrowers much more 
readily available.  Traditionally, borrowers with relatively low income relative to the cost 
of housing and low credit ratings, because of past problems of loan repayment or simply 
lack of evidence of ability and a willingness to pay, would access the FHA market. These 
borrowers had much higher loan default or delinquency rates and therefore a higher 
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percentage of such loans ended in foreclosure for any given economic and housing 
market conditions.  
 
Today borrowers with even lower credit scores than FHA borrowers and whose economic 
circumstances make them less likely to be able to make their loan payments and meet 
other essential home ownership costs (insurance and property taxes) and/or whose past 
behavior may indicate a lower disposition to pay their monthly bills for their housing and 
other necessities can readily find credit in markets for high-risk creditors like themselves.  
These credits carry higher interest rates, which lenders hope will deter borrowing by 
individuals who are likely not to repay their debts and that will cover the higher costs of 
those who do not repay loans. As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has noted, 
there are nearly 7.5 million home owners because of the rise of subprime borrowing over 
the past 15 years or so, accounting for about 14 percent of all mortgages outstanding; 
another 10 percent of all mortgages are referred to as near prime, that is, they have higher 
expected foreclosure rates than other prime loans.  In total, this represents about 24 
percent of all mortgages outstanding and over 12 million loans and home owners.  More 
importantly, most of the growth in this category has come in the past four years.  If 
continued, these shares and loans would take on even larger shares of the market.  With 
their associated higher foreclosure rates, foreclosures would be at a much higher level 
under the best of economic conditions. Thus the share of subprime loans, a relatively new 
phenomenon, is likely to replace the FHA share as a better indicator of foreclosure in 
housing markets.  But there is limited experience with such loans, especially on such a 
large scale, so estimates at a high level of aggregation (such as a state) may lack precision 
for some years to come. 
 
III. Cross-section regression results based on state foreclosure data  
To assess the importance of the various influences, foreclosure rates for 2006 in the 50 
states and District of Columbia were regressed on the measures that might account for 
foreclosure.  The estimated equation is: 
 
(1)   Foreclosure rate = A0 + A1* homeownership rate + A2*LTV90 
      + A3*FHA share + A4* employment growth 
      + A5*house price appreciation rate  
      + A6*unemployment rate 
  
The data used here are standard.  The foreclosure rate measure is the end-of-quarter 
foreclosure inventory as a percent of all residential mortgage loans and obtained from the 
Mortgage Bankers Association’s National Delinquency Survey.  The FHA share was also 
obtained from the Mortgage Bankers Association.  Payroll employment growth and the 
unemployment rate are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The 
Homeownership rate is from the U.S. Department of the Census.  Home price growth is 
based on price data from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. Other 
house price series, especially their annual growth rates, are highly correlated.  The loan–
to-value greater than 90 percent share is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Board.    
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The estimates of the coefficients are shown in Table 3. The quality of the regression 
result reported in the table is quite high; the R-squared, which is an indicator of the 
explanatory power of the equation, is relatively high, 65.37 percent, and the standard 
error of the estimate is about 0.39, which is low relative to the mean level of the 
foreclosure rate in 2006, about 1.02 percent.  However, in practical terms this measure 
means that there is a large range of error around the forecast level from the equation, so 
the equation cannot provide very precise forecasts of foreclosure, even if each of the 
measures accounting for foreclosure could be forecast with a high degree of precision.  
The equation is really most useful for assessing the importance or unimportance of each 
factor that could purport to account for the level of the foreclosure rate.   
 
Table 3 
Estimated regression estimates for state foreclosure rates (2006) 
Equation coefficient  Coefficient t-statistic 
A0 0.482 0.46 
A1 0.014 1.19 
A2 -0.009                   -1.12 
A3 0.026 1.39 
A4 -0.162 -3.46* 
A5 -0.074 -3.39* 
A6 0.103   1.75** 
*significant at 5 % level; ** significant at 10 % level 
 
All of the factors specified above affect foreclosure in the indicated direction, except for 
the share of loans with a loan-to-value ratio greater than 90 percent.3   In particular, an 
increase in the homeownership rate, a rise in the FHA share of loans, and a rise in the 
unemployment rate all have a positive effect raising the foreclosure rate in a state.  
Similarly, a rise in employment growth or in the rate of house price appreciation reduces 
the foreclosure rate.  Only the high loan-to-value percentage has the wrong sign.  A rise 
in the percent of loans with a loan-to-value ratio greater than 90 percent reduces the 
foreclosure rate, which is counterintuitive because these are the riskiest loans from a 
delinquency/foreclosure perspective. However, this effect and several of the other 
estimated effects are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  This means that 
there is a high probability that the observed effect of foreclosure could arise purely from 
chance.  The t-statistics indicate this statistical significance.  Generally a t-statistic below 
about two in absolute value indicates that the probability of observing the size of effect 
indicated by the coefficient, when the true effect is actually zero, is greater than five 
percent. For some observers, a t-statistic greater than one, which rules out a chance 
occurrence with a probability greater than about 32 percent, is used to determine whether 
the coefficient is more than a chance observation. This is a very low standard, however.  
                                                 
3 In NAR (2004) all of the same variables were included except for the state unemployment rate. In NAR 
(2003) the unemployment rate had been included (and insignificant), but the most significant variables 
here, house price appreciation and employment growth, were not.  The results in NAR (2004) were very 
similar, except that the LTV variable was statistically significant (t equals -2.2), but still had the wrong 
sign.  The R-square for the estimate for 2002 in NAR (2004) was lower, 0.451.  
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By this very loose standard, all of the factors except the constant can be said to be 
significantly different from zero at a 32 percent significance level. 
 
Using a five percent significance level, only employment growth and home price 
appreciation are statistically different from zero.  The unemployment rate is significant at 
an 8.6 percent level and the FHA share is significantly different from zero at a 17.3 
percent level.  The homeownership rate and the percent of loans with a loan-to-value 
ratio greater than 90 percent are only significant at a 24 and 27 percent level, 
respectively, and as noted, the loan-to-value ratio has the wrong sign.  
 
Simple correlations 
A simpler test of the importance of each of the factors is to use the correlation coefficient 
for each factor and foreclosure. Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients for the state 
and District of Columbia foreclosure rates.  All of the correlations are large and all have 
the “correct” sign. A correlation coefficient of zero indicates that two measures are 
independent of each other; a correlation coefficient of one or minus one is the largest 
possible in absolute value and indicates a perfect relationship between two measures.   
Note that the largest correlation in the group is between the FHA share of loans and 
foreclosure (0.87) although the FHA share is not significant in the regression analysis.  
All of these correlations are statistically significant at the 5 percent level for a simple 
linear relationship between foreclosure, and each measure and each correlation has the 
expected sign. The critical value for the correlation coefficient at the five percent level 
with 51 observations is 0.276.         
 
Table 4 
Correlation measures for state foreclosure rates and factors influencing them  
Factors correlated with the foreclosure 
rate 
 
Correlation Coefficient 
FHA share 0.87 
Share of loans with loan-to-value 
greater than 90 % 
0.40 
Homeownership rate  0.35 
Payroll employment growth rate -0.49 
Unemployment rate   0.41 
Home price appreciation rate -0.68 
 
One possible explanation for the weakness of some of the results in the regression 
equation is that the various factors on the right-hand-side of the equation, the factors 
accounting for foreclosure, are not really independent, as required by the statistical theory 
for estimating the regression and correctly interpreting the coefficient measures (see 
Table 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 9
Table 5 
Correlation of the state payroll employment rate and house price appreciation rate 
with other factors 
 
 
 
Factor  
Correlation 
coefficient with 
employment growth 
Correlation 
coefficient with home 
price appreciation 
FHA share -0.57 -0.54 
High loan-to- value 
share 
-0.39 -0.49 
Homeownership rate  -0.03 -0.49 
Unemployment rate -0.38 -0.22 
Employment growth 1.00 0.22 
Home price appreciation 0.22 1.00 
  
For example, the loan-to-value ratio, which has the wrong sign in the regression, but not 
in a simple correlation, is strongly related to home price appreciation rate (-0.49), so its 
effect could be arising primarily through the coefficient on the latter measure.  In fact, the 
two main factors, payroll employment growth and home price appreciation, have large 
correlations with some of the other factors that do not appear to be statistically significant 
in the cross-section regression. This is especially true for the FHA share, which has the 
strongest negative correlations with the two factors that appear to be most influential in 
having a positive relationship with the foreclosure rate.  Once one accounts for the latter 
two measures, there is no additional explanatory power from accounting for the FHA 
share itself, yet the latter has the largest single correlation coefficient with the foreclosure 
rate.   
 
Riskier loans have higher foreclosures rates than in the past 
Chart 2 shows that FHA loans have been a declining share of the national market for a 
long time.  In this decade, at least, the decline has been fostered by the ease of obtaining 
subprime loans. This phenomenon is a little less true in Indiana, where the FHA share 
remains relatively high compared with the national average (Table 6).   
 
The foreclosure rate on FHA loans has always been higher and more cyclical than for 
loans generally, but since 1995 the spread between the two foreclosure rates has widened.  
Recoveries from each of the housing cycle foreclosure spikes in 1998 and 2001 have 
been muted or incomplete, so that in each subsequent recovery the FHA foreclosure rate 
has failed to return to its pre-spike low.  This is not the case for the national foreclosure 
rate overall, at least in the latest cycle which returned the rate to about one percent in 
2005-06 and in early 2000. The earlier lows for the FHA foreclosure rate of 1.5 percent 
or somewhat less has not been seen in over 12 years.  This presumably reflects an 
increased risk of FHA loans since then.  As Tables 1 and 2 show, the growing share of 
subprime loans is even riskier.   
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Chart 2 
FHA loans are riskier, but a declining share of the national market  
FHA loans: falling market share, but higher foreclosure rate
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Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
The Government Accountability Office (2007) cites the displacement of FHA loans 
mainly by subprime loans to low-income and minority groups as the as the main source 
of the decline and indicates that what in other contexts is called “cream skimming” or 
“cherry picking” is responsible for the rising risk of the FHA loan portfolio.  Apparently 
the wide spread of risk for subprime loans over FHA loans suggests that the volume 
effects of newly available subprime loans overcame the cherry picking of subprime 
lenders.      
 
Does Equation 1 explain Indiana’s foreclosure rate? 
Equation 1 provides some limited insight into the sources of high foreclosure in Indiana 
and its neighboring state.  Table 6 shows the actual and forecast values of the average 
foreclosure rate in Indiana, Ohio and Michigan; equation 1 is used for the forecasts.  The 
table also provides the average value of each of the factors in the equation for each state.  
The equation is also used to fit the average measures for the United States.  While the 
equation is fitted so that the mean error for the 50 states and District of Columbia is zero, 
the same does not have to be true for the United States.  
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Table 6 
Accounting for Foreclosure in 2006  
 Indiana Ohio Michigan United States
Foreclosure rate    2.88%     3.27%    2.05%    1.05% 
Fitted value 1.79 1.87 2.11 0.96 
Forecast error 1.09 1.41 -0.06 0.08 
     
Homeownership 
rate 
          74.2 72.1 77.4 68.8 
High loan-to-value 
share 
31.0 20.0 32.0 19.0 
FHA share 13.9 10.7 7.1 7.4 
Employment 
growth 
  0.6  0.3 -1.1 1.8 
Price appreciation 
rate 
3.2 3.3 3.3 9.3 
Unemployment 
rate 
5.0 5.5 6.9 4.6 
   
 
Nonetheless, the fit is quite good.  For the three states shown, the fit for Michigan is 
nearly exact, but those for Indiana and Ohio are not.  Recall that the standard error of the 
equation is 0.39 so the errors for Indiana and Ohio are 2.8 and over three times as large, 
respectively.  Michigan has the highest forecast foreclosure rate, while Ohio and Indiana 
are second and third, respectively. While the fit of the general pattern of foreclosure rates 
is not bad, a large share of the actual foreclosure rate in Indiana and Ohio is not explained 
by the equation estimate.  Ohio, which leads the nation, does not have any indicators that 
are worse than the respective indicator for Indiana or Michigan.  Compared with Indiana, 
its higher forecast foreclosure rate is likely due to its slower employment growth and its 
higher level of the unemployment rate. Other indicators are more favorable in Ohio than 
in Indiana.  Michigan has an even higher unemployment rate and slower, actually 
declining, employment growth.  Additionally, Michigan has a higher homeownership rate 
and smaller FHA share, below the national average.  The weaker economy in Michigan 
accounts for its forecast higher foreclosure rate.  The high share of the high (over 90%) 
loan-to-value ratio works to lower the forecast loan-to-value rate, though only by a small 
amount (0.3%).  All three states had about the same small rate of house price appreciation 
in 2006.   
 
It is important to note that a cross-section study such as this one cannot address the 
potential for “reverse causality,” which occurs when a high correlation in a regression 
could indicate that the direction of causality is the opposite of that indicated in the 
equation.  In this case, one must consider that the high correlation of the FHA share and 
the foreclosure rate could reflect a causal link from the foreclosure rate to the FHA rate.  
It may be that states with relatively high foreclosure rates cause borrowers to fall back on 
FHA loans (or subprime loans) because of a lack of conventional funding sources. 
Similarly, a high foreclosure rate could slow the pace of house price appreciation, instead 
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of the causality direction presumed in equation 1.  Because of the relatively small size of 
the housing sector in the economy, it is less likely that the foreclosure rate influences the 
pace of employment growth or unemployment.  More detailed analyses involving time 
series data, observations over time could resolve the influence of reverse causation on the 
estimated effects. In future research, it will be important to examine the potential for 
reverse causality if for no other reason than that widespread expectation that the 
foreclosure spike will affect lenders, borrowers, house prices and production and sales for 
most market participants and not simply those involved in foreclosure events.    
  
IV. Other factors affecting foreclosure rates 
Some observers have argued that economic conditions have caused the deterioration in 
foreclosure rates.  Concerns over the spike in subprime rates have almost nothing to do 
with expectations of general economic conditions, however.  Another culprit is the 
supposed deterioration in the auto industry and manufacturing.  At least in Ohio and 
Indiana, output and employment in manufacturing and auto manufacturing and parts have 
not deteriorated.  The recent declines in motor vehicle and parts manufacturing are likely 
to be contributing to the rising foreclosure rate in Michigan, however, though the general 
decline in the economy is more widespread.   
 
Chart 3 
Manufacturing and auto output have not been declining in 1995-2006 
Autos and manufacturing did not decline when Indiana foreclosures rose
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Chart 3 shows U.S. manufacturing output and the output of motor vehicles and parts.  In 
1996-2001 when foreclosure rates were booming upward in Indiana and Ohio, auto 
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output and overall manufacturing were booming.  Similarly, auto output has risen at a 2.4 
percent pace from 2001 to 2006, only slightly below the 2.7 percent pace for 
manufacturing. In fact the recovery in autos was more rapid, so that until early 2004 it 
grew faster than overall manufacturing.  Since then there has been a slight decline in auto 
output, especially in 2006. Overall, auto production has been on a high plateau achieved 
in 1999, interrupted by the economic decline in 2000-01.  While not matching the stellar 
growth of 1992-99, this plateau is far above the level in the earlier period of stagnant 
production in 1973-92.   
 
The pattern of manufacturing and auto output does not match that of the foreclosure rate 
increase.  Most of the foreclosure rise occurred in 1996-2001. No doubt the 2001 
recession accounts for a little of the rise at the end, but the recovery in 2002-04 did not 
lead to a corresponding improvement in foreclosure rates.  Only Michigan’s rising 
foreclosure rate in 2006 appears to mirror performance in auto output.   
 
We can also look at Indiana jobs in transportation equipment (which includes motor 
vehicles, parts, trailers and about 13,000 other workers producing non-auto related 
equipment) and in motor vehicle production (Chart 4).4   
 
Chart 4 
Indiana auto employment has declined little since 1995, except in 2001  
Indiana transportation equipment jobs showed a large decline in 2001 
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4 The employment data were graciously supplied by the office of Hope Clark, Director of Labor Force 
Information, Indiana Department of Workforce Development, and are prepared by the U.S. Department of 
Labor.   
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Except in 2001, there were no large declines in either series. In particular, in 1995-2000 
jobs increased in both measures. Since 2001, there has been little change in the total or in 
motor vehicle production jobs in Indiana.  Thus, except in 2001, there is little support for 
the notion that overall job loss played a major role in foreclosure experience.  One 
possibility, however, is that job turnover may have risen over the period so that the 
mortgage holders who were getting jobs were not the same as those who lost jobs in the 
sector.     
 
Mortgage fraud 
Another factor that has been critically important in the region is mortgage fraud, although 
it is unlikely that it can account for much of the foreclosure problem.  The Indiana 
Bankers Association (2003) examined one source of mortgage fraud, predatory lending, 
some years ago.  As they point out, predatory lending is largely a problem for subprime 
loans and at the time, subprime lending was quite small.  Subsequently subprime lending 
has risen sharply, but there is still little reason to think that predatory lending or other 
sources of fraud related to subprime lending can account for a significant share of the 
foreclosure rate. 
 
It is difficult to measure the extent of fraud or the numbers of foreclosures that may be 
related to fraud. Sharick, Butts, Donahue, Larson and Croft (MARI 2007) have recently 
pointed to the rapid growth of fraud in mortgage finance.  They point to a rise in 
“Suspicious Activity Reports” related to mortgage fraud submitted to federally-insured 
financial institutions since 2000 and reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.  The number of these reports rose from 
3,515 in fiscal year 2000 to over 28,000 in fiscal year 2006.  The near eight-fold rise 
came largely in 2003-05 when submissions climbed from 5,387 to 25,989, or at a 69 
percent annual rate.  This corresponds to the period of surge in subprime lending.  MARI 
suggests that the incidence of fraud is much larger because these reports are for federally 
insured institutions only.  However, many of these reports, if not most, are not likely to 
involve fraud because they reflect “suspicious” activity.  Nonetheless, MARI points to 
losses due to fraud of perhaps one billion dollars in 2006.  Note that the total number of 
reports in 2006 is less than 5 percent of loans in foreclosure. 
 
The top ten states for mortgage fraud for all loan originations, according to MARI, 
include Michigan and Illinois among Indiana’s neighbors.  Michigan has been among the 
top four states since 2004 and was third in 2006.  Illinois ranked seventh in 2006, but was 
third in 2005.  For a separate subprime mortgage fraud index, Indiana ranked seventh in 
the nation in 2006 and had ranked fourth in 2002 (in the intervening period it ranked 8th, 
14th and 12th).  Among the current top 10 list for subprime loans, Michigan ranked third 
in 2006, second in 2005 and third in both 2003 and 2004.  Ohio also made this top 10, 
ranking 9th in 2006, seventh in 2005, fourth in 2004 and sixth in 2003.  Thus, all three of 
the highest ranking states for foreclosure rank high on the MARI index of subprime 
mortgage fraud.  While fraud may not account for much of the foreclosure problem, it is 
the least tolerable reason and it does seem to be worst where foreclosures are highest.   
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V. Conclusions and Outlook 
The nation is bracing for an emerging spike in foreclosures which will impale Indiana 
and its neighbors, but this region already has seen an unusual rise in the foreclosure rate 
dating back to the mid-1990s and it has led the nation in foreclosures since 2001.  While 
many factors have been cited, the principal ones have been the predominance of high risk 
loans, originally from FHA and later from subprime lenders.   
 
A cross-section analysis of the state foreclosure rate in 2006 indicates that the main 
factors accounting for foreclosure are the FHA share, the lack of house price appreciation 
and the growth rate of payroll employment.  The former share is the most highly 
correlated single factor and it is highly correlated with other factors accounting for 
foreclosure.  With the recent surge in higher risk subprime loans, future work will require 
incorporating measures of these loans in explanations of foreclosure.  But so far there is 
only limited information and these loans cannot simply be lumped together with risky 
FHA loans because they are even more risky.  It is likely that the prevalence of high risk 
FHA loans have played a key role in the rise in foreclosure rates in Indiana and that the 
recent rising share of subprime loans has kept foreclosures from falling and soon will 
contribute to a further spike in foreclosures.  In Michigan, the foreclosure rate has risen 
more recently and is likely more closely related to poor economic performance, 
especially in the past three years or so in the auto industry.  Ohio has led the nation in 
foreclosure since 2003.  There a weak economy, especially slow growth of employment 
and a higher unemployment rate have played important roles.  
 
There are other factors that are frequently mentioned but they do not fit the pattern of 
emerging foreclosure from 1995-2006 or else they are not large enough to have had much 
substantive effect on the overall foreclosure picture.  Auto sector and manufacturing 
production and employment do not fit the pattern of rising foreclosure in Ohio and 
Indiana except in one year, the recession in 2001.  Predatory lending and other more 
prevalent means of mortgage fraud have had major damage on some borrowers, but most 
indicators do not support the presence of a major quantitative effect on the overall 
foreclosure rate.   
 
There are ample remedies on offer for fixing the foreclosure problem.  Most of them 
involve making credit to first-time and other riskier borrowers more difficult.  But more 
difficult translates for lenders into more costly and that will mean that the achievement of 
the American dream of homeownership will become needlessly frustrated for many more 
potential homeowners  than the number of foreclosures avoided.  Proposals for lender 
forbearance are reminiscent of regulatory forbearance during the U.S. Savings and Loan 
crisis in the 1980s.   A key lesson from that experience was that forbearance substantially 
raising the costs of failure when failure is inevitable or is fostered by the forbearance 
itself.  Certainly the restoration of prudent lending standards is essential, but excessive 
and costly changes that will limit mortgage credit availability or reduce the use of new 
technologies to make housing affordability greater are likely to be self-defeating.  
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Indiana ranked ninth in the nation in homeownership in 2006, tied with New Hampshire 
and South Carolina, according to the U.S. Bureau of Census.  Michigan was second in the 
nation and Ohio was 19th.  Kentucky and Illinois, the remaining Indiana neighbors also 
had homeownership rates that were well above average.  Indeed, the Midwest leads the 
nation in homeownership. Policy makers should insure that actions to address foreclosure 
do not jeopardize the achievement of this goal. Homeownership is boosted by relatively 
low home prices and by the availability of low cost credit to risky borrowers.  
Unfortunately these conditions are also favorable to a higher incidence of foreclosure. 
Education of borrowers, especially first-time home buyers, and the education of lenders 
in traditional prudent lending practices are more likely to foster lower foreclosure rates, 
while also promoting homeownership, than other proposed remedies.5    
 
Outlook 
Forecasting the size of the future spike in foreclosures is difficult.  There is only limited 
experience with nontraditional loans and subprime loans.  Subprime (and alt-A) loans are 
about 25 percent of all mortgages.  At worst, in early 2002, foreclosures on subprime 
loans hit about 15 percent. A repeat of this experience with the now-larger share of 
subprime loans could mean that subprime foreclosures alone could raise the overall 
foreclosure rate by 4 percent.  With the remainder running slightly above normal, say 
around one percent, the overall foreclosure rate would reach about 4.75 percent, almost 
four times the current rate and the highest since the Mortgage Bankers Association began 
collecting data. It is not implausible that the foreclosure rate on subprime loans could be 
far worse, say double the 2002 level, or 30 percent.  In that case, the overall foreclosure 
rate would reach more than 8 percent. Such a level would mean about 1.6 to 3.2 million 
home loans in foreclosure at the peak and this would have serious consequences for the 
housing industry, housing prices and, at the top end, for the economy. 
 
It remains to be seen whether the coming spike in the foreclosure rate could have a major 
impact on the housing market, financial institutions or the overall economy.  The housing 
industry has already adjusted to the situation by drying up funds for riskier loans, 
depressing prices and sales of both new and existing housing.  The emerging surge in the 
foreclosure rate is more likely to affect prices on neighboring properties and sales and 
will not appreciably add to the deterioration of production and employment in the 
housing sector.  Over the past year, housing sector developments reduced annual growth 
at most by one percent and this may already be declining.  This was not enough to induce 
recession or to significantly noticeably affect depository institutions and is not likely to 
be large enough in the future to do so either.  Note that this does not suggest that housing 
markets are about to improve.  It only requires that new construction flatten out at current 
depressed levels or at least slow the pace of descent.  Record foreclosure rates will 
contribute to uncertainty in the housing market, however, depressing prices and further 
postponing recovery in housing, but Indiana and Ohio residents, and increasingly 
Michiganders, already knew that. 
 
                                                 
5 Weicher (2007) focuses on the trade-off between maintaining the remarkable growth and level of 
homeownership and the temporary risk of higher foreclosure rates, especially in the riskier segments of the 
mortgage market.   
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The spreading of risk in mortgage markets has meant that the repricing of mortgage-
related assets will occur very quickly and with less damage than earlier when these assets 
were concentrated on the books of banks and other financial institutions and were not 
able to be marketed easily. Moving ownership of homes from buyers who cannot afford 
the increasing or even unchanging terms of their mortgages will be much slower, 
dragging out the adjustment of housing market prices, sales and production of new units.  
As a result, the uncertainty and risk associated with housing finance will continue for 
several quarters, even though the worst of the effects on lenders and financial institutions 
is likely to occur much more quickly.      
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